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Abstract
Commercialization (private sector or Non-SBIR federal funding) of federally sponsored
innovations is a key congressionally mandated goal of the Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. While much attention has
focused on quantifying and assessing the commercial outputs of the SBIR program, limited
research exists on the impact that business advisory support initiatives have on project
commercialization. These programs, such as the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP),
seek to augment the business capacity of SBIR/STTR award recipients by providing information
and resources focused on facilitating the commercialization process. I hypothesize that these
programs increase the probability of commercialization success for participating SBIR Phase II
projects. To test this hypothesis, I employed a logistic regression model exploring
commercialization outcomes from participants and non-participants from the Navy's Transition
Assistance Program (TAP). A dataset comprised of 993 Navy Phase II projects awarded between
2005 and 2008 was used to populate the model. The self-reported commercialization outcomes
contained in the dataset include 537 Navy TAP projects, and a comparison group of 456 Navy
Phase II projects who opted not to participate in the program during the years covered. The
resulting analysis found that the odds of success given that a project participated in the Navy TAP
ranged from 1.5 to 6.2 times the odds of success for a non-participating project, depending upon
firm characteristics. It was also found that for every dollar invested in the Navy TAP, $38 dollars
in commercialization outcomes were generated. This research demonstrates that external business
support can be an effective policy option for impacting the probability and magnitude of SBIR
commercialization success.

vii

1. Introduction
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program was established in 1982 to
strengthen the role innovative small businesses play in conducting federally funded research. In
addition to fostering innovation, the SBIR program sought to make use of, “small business to meet
Federal research and development needs” (Small Business Development Act, 1982). In 1992, its
sister program, the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program was established, and
required small businesses to partner with research institutions in an effort to bridge the gap between
basic research and commercialization (Small Business Research and Development Enhancement
Act, 1992). SBIR and STTR are three phased programs which require federal agencies to set-aside
a portion of their extramural research and develop budgets for competitively awarded grants or
contracts to small businesses. Federal agencies with extramural research and development budgets
greater than $100 million, are required to set-aside no less than 2.8 percent of those funds for the
SBIR program, and agencies with extramural research and development budgets greater than $1
billion are required to set-aside no less than .4 percent of those funds for the STTR program. 1
Eleven federal agencies are required to participate in the SBIR program because they meet
or exceed the extramural research and development budgetary threshold. Five of these agencies
also meet the requirements for the STTR program (Department of Defense, Department of Energy,
Department of Health and Human Services, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
the National Science Foundation). For FY2011 the cumulative extramural research and
development budget across the eleven participating agencies was approximately $84.6 billion, and
funds obligated from the SBIR/STTR programs were close to $2.5 billion (SBA Annual Report,
2011). SBIR/STTR funds are provided to awardees during Phase I (feasibility study) and Phase II
(research and development) of the program; however, SBIR funds are not allowed during Phase
III, the commercialization phase. Although the responsibility of commercializing the federally
sponsored research remains with the small business, in response to increasing congressional
interest on commercial outputs of the program, federal agencies have sought to impact

1

Prior to the 2011 reauthorization of the program, the set-a-side was 2.5 percent for SBIR, and .3 percent for
STTR. The reauthorization increases the SBIR set-a-side to 3.2 percent by FY 2017, and the STTR set-a-side to .45
by FY2016.
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commercialization by developing and administering commercialization/transition assistance
programs (henceforth referred to as commercialization assistance programs).
The birth of the SBIR concept traces back to the Research Applied to National Needs
(RANN) program established in the 1970s at the National Science Foundation (NSF). The program
sought to engage the private sector and shift NSF towards more applied research in an effort to
stimulate innovation and economic benefit from federal research and development funding (Green
& Lepkowski, 2006). The RANN program sought to address current and emerging societal
concerns by identifying technical problems and soliciting solutions from the private sector (e.g.
academia and industry), fund studies to demonstrate the feasibility of their solutions, and then
transfer the developed ideas to the commercial sector (Green & Lepkowski, 2006). A component
of the RANN program called for NSF to set-aside ten percent of the budget for small businesses,
which in 1982 only shared in 3 percent of federal research and development funding (Small
Business Research and Development Enhancement Act, 1992). This structure and small business
set-aside lead to the creation in 1976, by Roland Tibbetts, administrative officer of RANN, of the
SBIR program. In establishing the program Mr. Tibbetts sought to leverage the cutting edge
capacity of small firms by testing as many high risk technical ideas as possible (SBIR/STTR
Reauthorization Act Report, 2009). While the RANN program ended in the late 1980s, the SBIR
program survived and became law with the passing of the Small Business Innovation Development
Act of 1982. In establishing the program, Congress sought to leverage small innovative firms to
stimulate technological innovations that met both agency and national economic needs (Small
Business Development Act, 1982).
The national policy goal of leveraging federal research and development to champion
economic growth was part of a broader movement taking place during the 1980s. Other pivotal
pieces of legislation at the beginning of the decade included the Technology Innovation Act of
1980 (Stevenson-Wydler Act, 1980) and the Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act (BayhDole Act, 1980). These acts signaled a national policy shift towards the transfer of federal research
and development to the private sector to stimulate economic growth (Research and Development:
National Trends and International Comparisons, 2014). The Stevenson-Wydler Act addressed the
transfer of technology from federal research labs to industry, while, the Bayh-Dole act provided
for patent ownership to remain with recipients of federal research and development programs as
2

an incentive to encourage commercialization of the technology (Schacht, 2000). The focus on
economic outcomes of federal research and development has continued to be stressed in
subsequent reauthorizations and amendments of these acts, including the SBIR program.
Congress instructed federal agencies to factor a company’s commercial potential when
making awards as a component of the program’s 1992 reauthorization (Small Business Research
and Development Enhancement Act, 1992). This marked the first time commercial potential
became a factor in award decisions. Congress sought to dissuade agencies form making awards to
previous SBIR award winners who had failed to demonstrate successful commercialization of
previously funded projects, while encouraging agencies to make more awards to firms with a
commercialization track record--demonstrated through prior success commercializing SBIR
research (LaFalce, 1992). When the program was reauthorized in 2000, Congress required small
businesses to submit a commercialization plan as a part of their Phase II award application (Small
Business Reauthorization Act, 2000). This provision, supported by the National Venture Capital
Association and negotiated by the House Science Committee, sought to ensure that award winners
were planning for commercialization by ensuring they had a strategy in place to penetrate federal
or commercial markets (Udall, 1999). Taken together the 1992 and 2000 reauthorizations
emphasized commercialization as an integral component of the program. As Congress has stressed
the importance of economic outputs from federally sponsored research stemming from the
SBIR/STTR program, federal agencies have sought resources and mechanisms to support small
businesses through the commercialization process.
A survey of SBIR awardees found that a lack of market knowledge and marketing skills
was the most frequently cited obstacle to commercialization, and that many SBIR firms needed
business assistance to commercialize their technology (Cooper, 2003). According to the National
Research Council (2008), “Agencies have begun to see that the technically sophisticated winners
of Phase II awards are in many cases inexperienced business people with only a limited
understanding of how to transition their work into the marketplace” (p. 213). Commercialization
assistance programs are viewed by some program managers and outside observers as a mechanism
to overcome this knowledge gap.
The Department of Energy first developed a commercialization assistance program in 1989
to help companies market their SBIR funded projects (General Accounting Office, 1995). Since
3

then, additional federal agencies have implemented individualized versions of commercialization
assistance programs.2 While each agency’s SBIR commercialization assistance program is unique
to their mission, they tend to share common traits: they are voluntary for award recipients,
generally support business strategy development, seek to surface additional funding opportunities,
and provide access to market information (National Research Council, 2008).
Federal agencies have had the legal authority to implement commercialization assistance
programs since 1992. The Small Business Development Enhancement Act (1992) allowed federal
agencies to contract with a vendor to provide commercialization support to Phase I recipients using
resources from the agency SBIR set-aside. However, in the case of Phase II, the agency could not
provide services using set-aside funds, but instead, could permit the individual awardees to procure
services independently using a portion of their Phase II award funds. According to a General
Accounting Office report (1995), the authority to authorize small businesses to seek independent
support was criticized by SBIR program managers. Among their criticisms was the belief that
significant administrative burdens would arise from case-by-case reviews of company requests for
support (General Accounting Office, 1995). The Department of Energy, and subsequently the
Navy, worked around these restrictions by investing non set-aside funds to establish
commercialization assistance programs for Phase II awards.
In a 2007 hearing before the House Science and Technology Subcommittee on Technology
and Innovation, SBIR program managers from the five largest participating agencies were asked
to provide testimony regarding “what elements were needed to address financing and
commercialization in the SBIR program” (Small Business Innovation Research Reauthorization
on the 25th Program Anniversary, 2007). In a statement provided on behalf of the Department of
Defense, Linda Oliver, acting director of small business programs, requested both an increase in
the level of funding available for commercialization assistance and the authority, “to provide the
assistance directly or through the Phase II contract” (Small Business Innovation Research
Reauthorization on the 25th Program Anniversary, 2007). Oliver's testimony was the most specific
in terms of a commercialization assistance policy recommendation. While the other agencies were

2

For example, the Navy Transition Assistance Program was created in 2000, and the National Institutes of
Health Commercialization Assistance Program was created in 2004.
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not specific in their recommendations they echoed the belief that assistance to awardees was
important (Small Business Innovation Research Reauthorization on the 25th Program
Anniversary, 2007).
While the research literature on the SBIR program has focused extensively on the
commercial outputs of SBIR funded technologies (General Accounting Office, 1992; National
Research Council, 2008; Lerner, 1999), little attention has focused on the complementary activities
undertaken by agencies to facilitate commercialization of federally funded research. Despite the
limited qualitative or quantitative evidence of the programs' effectiveness, new resources and
authority for commercialization assistance programs were provided within the SBIR/STTR
Reauthorization Act of 2011. The SBIR program was amended to allow federal agencies to provide
commercialization assistance directly to an award recipient in an amount not to exceed $10,000
per awardee (SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act, 2011). The legislation also provided further
flexibility and resources by allowing federal agencies to use up to 3 percent of their SBIR set-aside
for administrative funding, including the implementation of commercialization initiatives
(SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act, 2011). As a result of these legislative changes, all participating
agencies can implement commercialization assistance programs and finance them using funding
from the SBIR set-aside.
Prior to this reauthorization, the implementation of commercialization assistance programs
for Phase II award recipients were limited to agencies that had the will and resources to use
administrative funding--non SBIR set-aside funds--to execute the programs. Given the continued
emphasis on commercialization and, recently legislated penalties for small businesses that fail to
meet minimum commercialization requirements (SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act, 2011), this
calculus may be changing. The 2011 Reauthorization established minimum benchmarks for
multiple-award winners as it relates to transitioning from Phase I to Phase II, as well as, from
Phase II to Phase III (commercialization). Firms that have received more than 20 awards during
the previous five fiscal years must have a Phase I to Phase II transition ratio of at least .25. The
commercialization benchmark (transition from Phase II to Phase III) applies to Phase I firms that
have won at least 16 Phase II awards during the past 10 years. These firms must have obtained an
average of $100,000 from sales/investments per Phase II, or their SBIR projects must have resulted
in a number of patents equal to at least 15 percent of the number of Phase II awards they won
5

during the 10 year period. Failure to meet these standards makes the firm ineligible for new Phase
I awards for a period of one year ("Performance Benchmarks", 2013).
The impetus for adding these performance standards was motivated by a need to “refocus”
the emphasis of the programs on Phase III commercialization. In explaining the need for the award
limits, the House Small Business Committee felt that federal agencies found it easier to make
Phase I and Phase II awards to a small set of firms rather than identifying a broader community of
firms interested in commercializing federally funded research (Creating Jobs through Small
Business Innovation Act Report, 2011). The report further reiterates that the primary, if not sole,
purpose behind the SBIR and STTR programs is commercialization of federally funded research
(Creating Jobs through Small Business Innovation Act Report, 2011). Despite this emphasis,
using small businesses to meet Federal research and development needs remains as one of the
legislated goals. So while commercialization is important, it is not the sole goal. However, given
this renewed focus on commercialization, based upon hearings and my conversations with program
managers, I anticipate more agencies will make use of the allowable amounts from the SBIR setaside to establish commercialization assistance programs (Small Business Innovation Research
Reauthorization on the 25th Program Anniversary, 2007).
This project is timely given the penalties for small firms who fail to meet the minimum
commercialization benchmarks, congressional focus on commercialization, and the new resources
and authority provided to federal agencies to support the commercialization process. Prior to this
new authority the SBIR set-aside funding was restricted to Phase I and Phase II awards for small
businesses. This new authority means that agencies can invest up to $5,000 to support Phase I
projects, and up to $10,000 to support Phase II projects, approximately 3% and 1% of the
recommended Phase I and Phase II award levels, respectively. Now that federal agencies can
facilitate commercialization through commercialization assistance programs, using funding from
the set-aside, they must weigh their interest in commercialization outcomes against those of
seeding innovations through additional SBIR Phase I and Phase II awards. If the full amounts
available for commercialization was applied to all award recipients, the total investment would
have been slightly more than $41 million for FY11, i.e. 1.6 percent of the FY11 SBIR and STTR
budget.

6

The literature on the SBIR program thus far has treated commercialization outcomes as
endogenous to the project. This thesis may indicate that commercialization outcomes are not solely
endogenous to the firm, by demonstrating exogenous support (commercialization assistance
programs) potentially enhances the probability of commercialization. Quantifying this effect will
allow federal agencies to seed innovation by making awards to the most technically promising
technologies,

and

augmenting

their

commercialization

capacity

through

external

commercialization assistance. This project quantifies the probability of commercialization given
that a project participated in the Navy’s commercialization assistance program. The findings will
support policy makers by clarifying the tradeoffs between supporting commercialization assistance
versus seeding new awards.
1.1. Navy Transition Assistance Program
The Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP) was established in 2000 by John Williams,
the Navy SBIR Program Manager, and is implemented by a support contractor, Dawnbreaker, Inc.3
The Navy invests approximately $15,000 per small business participant, utilizing the department's
administrative budget (National Research Council, 2007), to provide participants with access to
expert business consulting, market research, Department of Defense transition planning, and
marketing support during the 11-month Transition Assistance Program (Sullivan, 2013).

The

objective of the TAP is to provide information and points of contacts that help identify transition
(commercialization) paths, prepare marketing materials that convey the business opportunity, and
to provide access to technology evaluators and decision makers to surface funding opportunities
(Servo, 2013). The Navy TAP culminates in a partner/investor event called the Navy Opportunity
Forum. Small firm participation in the Navy Opportunity Forum is restricted to Phase II award
winners that have completed the requirements of that year’s Navy Transition Assistance Program.
The 2013 Navy Opportunity Forum was attended by more than 1,200 representatives from federal
acquisition programs, technology evaluators, decision makers from large DoD prime contractors,
large technology firms, and private sector investors. 4

3
4

I work for the support contractor, Dawnbreaker, Inc.
http://www.navyopportunityforum.com/
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The Navy requires all Phase II award recipients to attend a one-day Transition Assistance
Program (TAP) meeting held annually during the month of July. During this kickoff event
participants are exposed to information on the Navy SBIR program, successful commercialization
strategies, intellectual property protection techniques, and information on the Transition
Assistance Program. Following the event, participants have a two week period to opt into the TAP
program. 5 Those opting into the program receive project level support, with the costs covered by
the Navy. Participating firms are expected to invest the necessary time to complete program
deliverables and attend the Navy Opportunity Forum (Servo, 2013). This time expenditure is not
billable to their Navy SBIR and STTR contracts, which may serve as a deterrent for some, while
ensuring participants have “skin in the game.”
Participant commitment is important because the Navy TAP is a collaborative partnership
between the service contractor and the firm. TAP participants are provided a team composed of a
business consultant, market research specialist, and graphic designer. The business consultant uses
an iterative deliverable based approach while working with the participant. Their collaborative
back and forth effort is focused on enhancing marketing capacity and collateral. The business
consultant also provides transition and commercialization mentoring. They attempt to augment the
participant’s knowledge by surfacing information to clarify market opportunities and facilitate
transition and commercialization planning. The Dawnbreaker team takes the lead throughout this
process, but the TAP participant is required to partake in the development of commercialization
planning documents, review and participate in market research debriefs, and participate in at least
10 training webinars (topics range from: protection of intellectual property, working with prime
contractors, to developing a compelling Phase III transition Plan). If TAP participants fall too far
behind they are politely asked to withdraw from the program (Servo, 2013).
The TAP was explained by a program participant in testimony before the House Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology as so:
Galois has benefited from participation in several SBIR support resources, and especially
from those that focus on transition and commercialization. Prime among these is the
Navy’s Transition Assistance Program, or TAP, which gave Galois substantial new and
useful understanding and capability in commercialization. The program is voluntary for

5
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Navy Phase-II winners, and requires a commitment in time and money from the company
to participate. Over a year’s time and under advisor guidance, Galois learned or improved
capabilities in how to evaluate a particular market, assess a venture partner, write a business
plan, produce marketing collateral that is informative to defense industry primes, and
present at an industry-focused conference. Each of these skills has been reused and
deepened since that experience. Of particular note, the Dawnbreaker advisor provided
baseline criteria for examining venture opportunities, which Galois applied immediately to
the KSys opportunity. This information facilitated the development of that
commercialization effort (McKinney, 2011, p. 11).
Participants who have completed the Transition Assistance Program have reported
commercialization success. There were 693 projects presenting at a Navy Opportunity Forum
between 2002 and 2007, 61 percent of them reported non-SBIR funding within 18 months of
program completion. Those projects cumulative reported approximately $1.15 billion in Phase III
funding (Williams, 2010). The commercialization funding reported includes both sales in the
commercial market as well as non-SBIR federal funding for additional development or to procure
products or services resulting from the SBIR project. This definition reflects the dual goals of the
SBIR program to meet both agency needs and contribute to economic growth (Small Business
Research and Development Enhancement Act, 1992).
2. Literature Review
2.1. SBIR and Commercialization Assistance as a Response to Market Failures
Since markets only inefficiently allocate the pure public goods, like knowledge based
innovations, government plays a role in the research and development market. Martin and Scott
(2000) addressed this question while reviewing the economic literature of innovation based market
failure. They found that the limited ability of innovative firms to capture the benefits of their
research and development investments represented an innovation market failure resulting in
suboptimal investment in innovation from a public perspective. It was once held that larger firms
had a competitive advantage in the innovation market which allowed them to capture the benefits
of their research and development, however, they found that this innovation market failure
occurred irrespective of firm size.
Link (1999) offers additional support for the role information plays in a firm’s decision to
undertake research and development projects. While research and development market failures are
often discussed in terms of appropriating returns, Link (1999) recognizes and discusses the inherit
9

risks in advanced research and development. He notes that private firms face both technical and
market risks when determining their research and development investments. If firms view the
probability of reaping a commercial reward for a given investment as too risky, given the level of
knowledge needed to both develop the innovation and to market it, they will tend to under-invest
in research and development (Link, 1999, p. 193; Link and Scott, 2001, p. 764).
Link and Scott (2001) continue to stress the importance of market based risks in research
and development decisions. They identify technical and market based uncertainties when
considering these investments. Firms are concerned if their technology will meet the technical
specifications necessary to justify their investment, and even if they are confident that they can
meet those specifications, uncertainty remains over market acceptance. These risks factor into the
returns a private firm would expect from a given investment in R&D. Because of the technical and
market uncertainties, firms tend not to invest in projects with potentially high societal returns, but
lower prospects of private returns. Small firms receiving SBIR awards are faced with overcoming
both the technical and market based uncertainties of the federally sponsored research.
Generating social benefits from federal research and development investments in the
SBIR/STTR program is among the congressional goals. The SBIR/STTR program seeks to engage
small businesses to meet federal research and development needs as well as generate commercial
outcomes from those investments. While small firms in the SBIR program often possess the
technical skillset to meet the innovative challenges associated with the development of advanced
technologies, their ability to translate those technical developments into commercially viable, or
acquisition ready (in the case of the Department of Defense), products and services are often
lacking (National Research Council, 2008, p. 223). Federal program managers implementing
external advisory services are seeking to overcome these deficiencies, and maximize the positive
externalities and spillover effects of increased performance resulting from market based
commercialization of the federally sponsored technology. Their interest in influencing the firm
performance through external advisory support is closely linked to the market failure based
rationale for public and private partnerships.
Storey (2003) provides a discussion on why policies exist to influence small and medium
size firm performance through outside business advisory support services. He frames the
discussion in terms of two market failures. The first market failure he discussed focused on
10

imperfect information while the second examined positive externalities. As a response to imperfect
information, municipalities view small firms as ill-informed on the private benefits of external
business advisory services which results in the firm purchasing a "sub-optimal quantity of advice"
(p. 478), resulting in less than ideal performance. By offering commercialization assistance
programs, federal agencies are bringing the private advisory services to the small business, seeking
to overcome their underinvestment in support.
The second market failure perspective views the presence of socially beneficial outcomes
of higher performance which may result from investments in advisory services. These social
benefits will not occur without a subsidized approach because small firms will, "under-estimate
the private benefits of obtaining external advice/consultancy" (Storey, 2003, p. 482). While small
firms in the SBIR program often possess the technical skillset to meet the innovative challenges
associated with the development of advanced technologies, their ability to translate those technical
developments into commercially viable, or acquisition ready (in the case of the Department of
Defense), products and services often lacks (National Research Council, 2008, p. 223). The
SBIR/STTR program both seeks to diversify the federal research and development marketplace
while also generating societal benefits, including economic growth. I believe these dual goals
contributes to participating firm’s under-estimating the benefits of securing private sector advisory
support.
The SBIR/STTR topic generation process signals an innovation gap to the research and
development marketplace. While successful winners of SBIR/STTR Phase I and Phase II awards
demonstrate the technical capacity to overcome this challenge, they may be under the false
impression that their technical development translates into commercial acceptance. This particular
concern exists within the acquisition community, where the SBIR/STTR may also signal a
potential customer. However, navigation of the complex federal acquisition marketplace requires
business expertise that firms often do not possess (National Research Council, 2008, p. 224), but
is necessary to maximize societal benefits from taxpayer funded research and development.
In summary, federal subsidizing of research and development seeks to address the
underinvestment of private firms in a manner that maximizes societal benefits. In establishing the
SBIR/STTR programs, Congress sought to harness the innovative capability of small businesses
to both diversify the federal research and development service marketplace and generate societal
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benefits. Maximizing the economic outcomes from the federal SBIR/STTR investments occur as
firms commercialize (either in commercial markets or through the federal acquisition process)
products and services which generate jobs, support advanced weapon systems, or drive down
federal research and development costs through increased competition. While the small firms
attracted to the SBIR/STTR programs may be technically advanced, they may lack the necessary
business capacity to create these down-stream societal benefits. Storey (2003) found that small
and medium firms tend to underinvest in the services which could augment their business capacity
because they are unclear or underestimate the long-term benefits of those investments. To
overcome this information failure, and to maximize the societal benefits from federal research and
development funding, federal agencies have begun establishing external advisory support
programs.
2.2. SBIR Commercialization Assistance Needs
The need for commercialization assistance was briefly discussed by Ronald Cooper,
innovation policy specialist at the United States Small Business Administration, while describing
the rationale for, and the performance of, the SBIR program. Within his description and
explanation of the SBIR/STTR programs, Cooper (2003) described a prospective program to
enhance SBIR commercialization. He envisioned a two part program focusing on both the financial
gap between Phase II and early-stage capital, as well as business development support (p. 148). In
describing the need for additional assistance, he felt the firms often had "top quality technological
innovations, [but] often require business assistance to move them to a point where private markets-venture and angel capital--are willing to invest in them" (p. 148). This chasm between early stage
ideas and sufficient capital to transform those concepts into commercial products is often referred
to as the “valley of death” (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Diagram of the "Valley of Death" Source: (National Research Council, 2007, p. 8)

The “valley of death” is not restricted to transforming technological information into
commercially available products, but also appears when SBIR/STTR firms seek to commercialize
their innovations within the federal marketplace. While the SBIR/STTR programs provide early
stage seed funding to create new technical ideas and support the prototype development of those
ideas, the funding is often inadequate to reduce the technical risks to acceptable levels for the
federal acquisition community. This gap is depicted in Figure 2.6 The Navy TAP also supports
firms in their efforts to overcome this valley of death by focusing on the business skills necessary
to identify capital opportunities and convey their business case, in both the commercial and federal
marketplaces.

6

Technology Readiness Levels originated
(http://esto.nasa.gov/files/TRL_definitions.pdf).
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Figure 2 SBIR/STTR Valley of Death Diagram

Projects developed under SBIR/STTR Phase I and Phase II funding typically reach a
technology readiness level (TRL) of 4 or 5; however, the acquisition arm of the Department of
Defense will often view that technology as too risky to invest programmatic funds. The DoD
program offices are more willing to invest additional development or demonstration funding when
a project reaches a TRL of 7 or 8 (National Research Council, 2007, p. 58). Given this gap,
SBIR/STTR firms must traverse this valley by identifying resources to continue the development
of their technology and reduce risk if they are going to successfully transition their technology.
The Navy TAP supports them in these efforts by providing them marketing collateral, business
mentoring, and a partner/investor event that connects them to funding opportunities.
This technology transition process has been defined as a two-way long-term
communication process (National Research Council, 2004, p. 1). Michael McGrath, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation) identified five
conditions that needed to be met for successful technology transition to the government: there must
be a need, effective solution, business case, budgetary resources and acquisition mechanism
(National Research Council, 2004, p. 27). Cooper (2003) and others (National Research Council,
2008) have observed that SBIR/STTR award winners have the technical capacity to develop
theoretically effective solutions, however, communicating their business case and strategically
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planning around the budgetary and acquisition environments could be enhanced. A survey of SBIR
award winners confirmed a need for this additional support.
Under a grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Palmintera (2001) developed and
administered a survey to the population of SBIR Phase II award winners between FY94 and FY97
to assess the business support needs of firms in the program. The survey was administered to 2,575
firms across the eleven participating federal agencies and had a 24 percent response rate. The
results of that research provide the logic underpinning many of the efforts federal agencies have
undertaken to augment the business and marketing capacity of SBIR award recipients. Palmintera
found that two thirds of respondents indicated that they needed some form of assistance. Although
the census based approach does not result in a representative random sample, Palmintera did find
that assistance varied by firm size, with smaller firms (1-5 employees) requiring more support for
commercialization planning and marketing compared to firms with 50 or more employees.
Palmintera also found that the need for marketing and commercialization related services,
including support in partnering with other firms, were among the most frequently cited needs-irrespective of firm size, technology area, or sponsoring agency.
Transitioning innovative ideas into products and innovations is complex and challenging
irrespective of the marketplace (federal acquisition or commercial). Firms face a challenge
attracting the necessary capital to translate high risk early stage research into commercially viable
products. This “valley of death” exists within the SBIR/STTR community, as the typical project
is not developed to a sufficient level to signal a reduced risk to the marketplace (acquisition or
commercial). The ability to market and convey the business case for these technologies plays a
role in overcoming these challenges, but it has been found that many SBIR/STTR firms feel they
need additional support in this area (Palmintera, 2001; National Research Council, 2008).
Programs like the Navy TAP seek to provide this additional support.

2.3. Business Advisory Support as a Commercialization Need
Technical assistance to small firms is not unique to the SBIR/STTR programs. Examining
the rationale behind other programs can augment the understanding of programs focused on the
SBIR/STTR community. One example stems from the Small Business Development Center
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program. Chrisman and McMullan (2004) examine a potential knowledge gap while assessing the
long-term impact of the Small Business Development Center. According to them, "in many cases
there is a gap between the knowledge possessed by entrepreneurs and the knowledge required for
successful venturing" (p. 232). In many ways the underlying rationale for outsider assistance is
consistent with the knowledge gap perspective expressed in support of developing
commercialization assistance programs (National Research Council, 2008, p. 223). Chrisman and
McMullan (2004) research stemmed from a longitudinal survey of Pennsylvania based SBDC
clients surveyed in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2001. Utilizing a comparison group drawn from a 2000
study on general population survival rates for firms between 1992 and 1996, the authors measured
the difference in firm survival rates and found that the SBDC supported ventures had a
significantly higher survival rate.
Cumming and Fisher (2012) sought to measure the impact of publicly funded advisory
services on small and medium sized enterprises targeted towards growth and innovation. The
authors utilized a population of 228 firms that contacted the Ontario based Investment Network, a
business advisory service focused on small firm growth. They found that 101 firms received
advising from the program, but by using pre-entry program data on all 228 firms, the authors were
able to econometrically control for self-selection. The program participants demonstrated a
positive and significant difference in financial outcomes including sales and financing, based on
regression analysis. Their ability to control for self-selection is important because entry into the
federally funded commercialization assistance programs is voluntary. While controlling for selfselection is beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be considered in future research to compensate
for the non-randomness of program participation.
These two studies provide both rational and sample approaches to evaluating business
advisory services. Business advisory services have been provided because small firms often have
a gap in their current knowledge and what is required for success. Through a comparison group
design Chrisman and McMullan (2004) found that Small Business Development Centers
supported firms had higher firm survival rates. Cumming and Fisher (2012) employed regression
techniques to control for possible self-selection bias, although beyond the scope of this project,
their approach can be illustrative for future projects.
2.4. Assessing the SBIR Program
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The 2008 assessment of the SBIR program conducted by the National Research Council
(2008) may be the most in-depth evaluation of the program. The National Research Council study
sought to assess if the SBIR program has met congressional goals, with an emphasis on
commercialization (National Research Council, 2008, p. 13). To complete the study, stakeholders
from the five largest participating federal agencies (i.e., Department of Defense, Department of
Energy, Health and Human Services, National Aeronautics and Aerospace Administration, and the
National Science Foundation) were involved in case studies, symposiums, interviews, and surveys
to determine how the program has functioned, and assess the program’s performance.
The primary data source for the study was a survey that sought to, “understand both
commercial and non-commercial aspects, including knowledge base impacts, of SBIR, and to gain
insight into impacts of program management" (National Research Council, 2008, p. 229). The
survey was administered in 2005 to SBIR Phase II award recipients between 1992 and 2001, using
a 20 percent layered random sampling technique. The process started with a random sample of the
entire award population, followed by a 20 percent random sample for each award year, with a final
sample to ensure at least 20 percent of the agency's awards were included. The final result was a
sample of 4,523 projects, of which, 1,916 responded to the survey, a 42 percent response rate.
The National Research Council study found that the SBIR program was, "sound in concept
and effective in practice" (National Research Council, 2008, p. 54). More specific to this thesis,
the study found that 47 percent of the projects reported sales related to their SBIR funded project,
indicating some commercial success. While not addressed in detail, the report also touched on the
agencies’ implementation of commercialization assistance programs. While the study did not
assess the outcomes of commercialization assistance programs, it showed federal agencies’ interest
in supporting the commercialization process. A key theme in the discussion on commercialization
assistance programs was the take-away from interviews with, "awardees, agency staff, and
commercialization contractors, [all of whom] indicate[d] that the business side of commercial
activities is often where companies experience the most difficulty” (National Research Council,
2008, p. 223). This concept was reinforced by firms selected for case studies in the report, with
seven out of the nine referencing participation in a support program specifying some level of value.
The Phase II survey used by the National Research Council was, in many ways, built on
previous work by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The General Accounting Office (1992)
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conducted one of the first studies to measure private sector commercialization of SBIR Phase II
awardees. Utilizing a census approach, GAO administered a questionnaire to Phase II award
recipients between 1984 and 1987. While their approach found there was private-sector
commercialization of the federally sponsored research and development, measured through both
sales and additional development funding, they could not measure the effectiveness of the program
because they lacked “formal criteria by which to judge the results, once they [were] determined”
(General Accounting Office, 1992, p. 16). The GAO study uncovered the presence of privatesector output, without indicating program effectiveness.
A central contribution from the GAO study has been the measurement of
commercialization through sales and additional development funding. GAO defined sales to,
"include all sales of product(s), process(es), service(s), or other sales to federal or private-sector
customers, resulting from the technology associated with the project." They defined additional
development funding to, "include funding from federal or private-sector sources, from the
companies themselves, or from other related SBIR awards used for further development of the
technology associated with the Phase II project" (General Accounting Office, 1992, p. 20). These
metrics have continued to be implemented in subsequent studies as measures of SBIR awardee
private-sector commercialization, and will be used in this study as a proxy for the dependent binary
commercialization variable.
The National Research Council (2000) assessed the Department of Defense Fast Track
Initiative, a program that provided interim funding to SBIR Phase I awardees during the period
between Phase I and Phase II for projects that demonstrated third party matching funding (which
was contingent on the project going to Phase II). These firms also received an expedited Phase II
review process and were guaranteed Phase II selection given fulfillment of their Phase I technical
goals and demonstration that the program was technically sufficient. To complete their assessment
of the Fast Track program, the National Research Council developed and administered a survey
instrument to a sample of Fast Track recipients and a control group. The project based survey
covered 379 Phase II awards between 1992 and 1996. The survey resulted in a 72 percent response
rate and was supplemented by 55 case studies. They found that the, "program was encouraging
commercialization and attracting new firms to the program" (National Research Council, 2000, p.
24). While the study continued to use the GAO established measurements of commercialization
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success: presence of sales or additional development funding; the fast track initiative departed
from previous efforts by surveying a sample of Phase II award winners and comparing their actual
and expected results with a matched control group.
The control group used in this methodology was matched on, "solicitation year, number of
previous Phase II awards, size of the firm, geographic location, women or minority ownership,
and technology area of the project" (National Research Council, 2000, p. 55). The factors used to
match the control group offer insight into this project, and in a few aspects will be replicated during
this study. While the National Research Council study utilized projects from other programs to
develop its matched sample, this thesis will utilize Phase II awards that were eligible for the Navy
TAP, but chose not to participate.
While the reviewed literature thus far has sought to demonstrate or assess the presence of
near-term commercialization impact, Lerner (1999) sought to answer the question of the long-term
impact of the SBIR program by applying an empirical framework to the GAO (1992) data-set.
Lerner (1999) utilized a matched pair design to measure the long-term employment and sales
growth of 1,435 firms over a 10 year period (p. 286). To conduct the research he used a subset of
541 SBIR firms from the GAO survey and matched them with two matched sets of similar firms-one based on industry and firm size, and the other based on location and firm size. Lerner found
that the SBIR awardees enjoyed substantially greater employment and sales growth, although not
uniform. The “superior growth of SBIR awardees was confined to firms based in ZIP codes with
substantial venture capital activity” (Lerner, 1999, p. 290). Although Lerner utilized the GAO data
set to analyze the long-term impact of SBIR in terms of employment and sales growth, the
relationship of those outputs were more broadly attributed to the SBIR program without insight
into the underlying drivers of commercialization.
2.4.1. Commercialization Probability
Link and Ruhm (2009) sought to isolate the variables that impact the probability of
commercialization. Utilizing data on 405 NIH SBIR Phase II awardees from the National Research
Council (National Research Council, 2008) assessment of the SBIR program, they estimated the
probability of commercial success as a function of additional development funding and four
control variables: knowledge base, owner demographics, NIH funding institute, and the presence
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of university involvement. The authors found that the mean commercialization probability for NIH
SBIR awardees was slightly more than 50 percent (.5111). The research of Link and Ruhm offers
insight into a potential driver of commercialization of SBIR Phase II awards, specifically
additional development funding. Utilizing their probit model, they identified the marginal benefit
of additional development funding based on two subsets of NIH firms, those who reported
additional development funding as part of the National Research Council study, and those who did
not. They quantified the marginal effect of additional development funding, finding that it
"correlates with a 35 percentage point increase in the probability of commercialization" (Link &
Ruhm, 2009, p. 16). Their quantification of the contribution of control variable's impact on
commercialization is informative for my research. They identified additional development as a key
independent variable. While this project is focusing on participation in commercialization
assistance programs, the general goal of these programs is to augment small firms’ capacity to
secure commercialization funding, which would include both sales and additional development
funding. Based on the work of Link and Ruhm, to the extent that commercialization assistance
programs are effective, one would expect an increased probability of commercialization for
program participants.
While their work was specific to NIH, subsequent work by Link and Scott (2010) took a
closer look at the probability of success across the federal agencies participating in the National
Research Council (2008) study. They examined the probability of commercialization success of
SBIR Phase II awardees across the five largest participating agencies. They framed their research
as an effort to quantify the risk government incurs when it serves as an entrepreneur. Utilizing data
collected as part of the National Research Council's assessment of the SBIR program, the authors
developed an econometric model using data for each agency to quantify the level of risk the
respective agencies incurred. Link and Scott (2010) found that the mean probability that companies
would commercialize their SBIR research was, "somewhat less than .50, the probability of heads
on the toss of a fair coin" (p. 599). If government as an entrepreneur accepts a 50 percent chance
of failure when seeding an SBIR Phase II project, it would be reasonable to conclude that the
development and funding of a commercialization assistance program would be focused on
reducing that failure probability. While their research included a large number of control variables,
participation in transition or commercialization assistance program was not among them. Their

20

work provides a framework for further understanding the role commercialization assistance
programs can play as a risk mitigation strategy.

3. Research Design
I hypothesize that the Navy's Transition Assistance Program (TAP) increases the
probability of commercialization success for SBIR Phase II projects. To test my hypothesis I will
apply a logistic regression model to the population of treated projects between 2005 and 2008,7
and a comparison group of eligible projects that chose not to participate in the program during the
same period. Previous outcome evaluations of the SBIR program have identified
commercialization as a key indicator of program success, defining the measure as any non-SBIR
sales or additional development funding received (General Accounting Office 1992, National
Research Council, 2004, National Research Council 2008). A lack of market knowledge and
marketing skills was a frequently cited commercialization obstacle by SBIR awardees (Cooper,
2003). Commercialization Assistance Programs, like the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program,
seek to overcome these obstacles by providing project level marketing, business strategy, and
transition support. This research will seek to determine the effectiveness, measured by the odds of
success between the treated and non-treated projects, of the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program
(TAP) by modeling a binary project level commercialization variable.
H1: Navy Transition Assistance Program increases the probability of project
commercialization.
3.1. Threats to Validity
My research design limits the ability to generalize these findings beyond the Navy
Transition Assistance Program (TAP). The design is a non-experimental design, and these projects
may not be representative of the broader SBIR/STTR community. There are other programmatic

7

The Navy TAP is an 11-month program and provides firms the option of participating in the first or second
year of their Phase II award. Choosing 2008 as the cutoff ensured that projects had exhausted their Navy TAP
eligibility and would have completed the program by the time the dataset was assembled.
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characteristics which limit the ability to broadly generalize these findings to commercialization
assistance programs. Among these include differences in vendors, acquisition versus commercial
focused support, program components, and per project support investments.
The voluntary nature of the Transition Assistance Program introduces the prospect of
selection bias. Program participants may possess unobserved characteristics and motivations that
may not be reflected across both the treated and comparison populations. While I recognize this
possibility, accounting for potential selection bias is beyond the scope of this research. By not
accounting for the potential of selection bias, findings cannot be solely attributable to the
intervention, but must be given with the caveat that there may be unobserved factors inherent to
the project or firm.
A possible threat to internal validity is the potential underreporting of commercialization
outcomes between the treatment and comparison groups. While this is discussed later, I should
note that the commercialization data is self-reported by the firms. A smaller percentage of the
treated projects provided a commercialization update than the comparison group. To guard against
mistakenly over reporting the impact of the treatment, a separate lower bound analysis will be
employed.
3.1.1. Question of Causality
While I have mentioned concerns over potential selection bias and the limitations of this
dataset to address them, I feel it is important to discuss the potential impact of selection bias as it
relates to causality and my results. While the results indicate that projects that participated in the
Navy TAP feature higher odds of success compared to the non-participating counterparts,
questions can be raised regarding the underlying projects. It is possible that projects entering the
TAP have higher prospects for commercialization compared to those not entering the program. It
is also possible that firms when deciding on which projects to enter into the program may chose
not to enter projects they feel have miniscule opportunities for commercialization. Experimentally
ascertaining the answer to the underlying nature of the projects entering the TAP versus those not
entering the TAP is not feasible given the non-experimental development of this dataset. With that
stated, I do not believe that the underlying projects entering the TAP are more commercializable
than those not entering the program.
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It is known, based on vendor experience that firms do make tradeoff decisions on which
projects to enter into the program. As shared by Dr. Jenny Servo, president of Dawnbreaker,8 when
principal investigators have multiple eligible projects but lack the bandwidth to shepherd all their
projects through the program, they are advised by Dawnbreaker to opt-in the project which requires
the most support (personal communication, June 18, 2014). It is Dawnbreaker’s belief that through
the market research and under their business advisement they can add more clarity into avenues of
commercialization for theses more challenging projects. Also, from the perspective of the vendor,
if a firm has a transition or commercialization path identified, they may be less willing to invest
the necessary time to complete the program. The time commitment is a key factor why I do not
believe participants are entering what they perceive as more commercializable projects.
I do not believe firms would knowingly enter projects they sensed to have higher
commercialization prospects. The TAP requires nearly a 1-year time commitment to participate
and complete the program. It is unclear to me why a firm would invest those resources to
participate if they knew their projects were aligned for success. Although the services of the TAP
are paid on behalf of the firm, the program is gated, and requires iterative activity between the firm
and Dawnbreaker (vendor executing the TAP). As stated previously, the time commitment in the
program ensures that participating firms have “skin in the game.” The collaborative and continual
development of program deliverables requires firm participants to invest their own resources—
which cannot be billed to their contracts. This commitment was expressed by a TAP participant in
congressional testimony, “The [TAP] program is voluntary for Navy Phase-II winners, and
requires a commitment in time and money from the company to participate” (McKinney, 2011,
p.11). I do not believe firms would invest these additional resources to participate if they felt their
projects had a higher than average prospect for success. Based upon these factors and my
interactions with a number of SBIR/STTR project participants, I do not believe the TAP is solely
reflecting results of more commercializable projects.
3.2. Data Sources

8

Dr. Servo executes the Navy TAP, and is my employer.
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I utilized the Navy's public SBIR and STTR advanced search engine9 to begin compiling
the dataset. The database contains project data on Navy SBIR and STTR awards, including
summary reports and information on Navy TAP participants. Through this database I was able to
identify the population of Navy SBIR and STTR Phase II award winners for fiscal years 2005
through 2008, including the subpopulation of TAP program participants. These data were merged
with the proprietary DoD commercialization database which contains project level, self-reported,
commercialization data on SBIR and STTR Phase II awards. The two datasets were matched based
on a one-on-one match of project contract number.
The DoD commercialization database captures cumulative SBIR project level
commercialization data. The DoD requires SBIR Phase II award winners to update project
outcomes on previous awards any time they apply for new DoD SBIR awards, one year after the
start of their Phase II award, and at the completion of their Phase II. The DoD also requests annual
updates following completion of the project (National Research Council, 2009, p. 120). While
relying upon self-reported data may lead to certain bias’s, like under/over reporting, I believe the
DoD reporting requirements and the necessity for project updates to be digitally certified by firm
officials minimizes any concerns. Evidence of the high level of compliance can be seen in Table
1, where 94.5 percent of the population of Navy Phase II projects during the fiscal years of interest
provided an update to the DoD commercialization database.
Although the DoD commercialization database captures a high percentage of the projects,
there is variation between the percentage of captured projects amongst the treatment and
comparison groups. I will describe the sample selection process later but, it is important to note
that the treatment group has a smaller number of projects providing updates than the comparison
group (81 percent versus 89 percent, respectively). This could indicate an underreporting bias. I
assume two possible scenarios: one, the projects followed a similar pattern of success but failed to
report; or, two, they were unsuccessful and chose not to report their lack of commercialization.
Scenario one would lead to understating of the interventions impact. Under the second scenario,
the potential bias may result in the overstating of the interventions impact. To protect against
overstating the impact, I will add a sensitivity model under the assumption that the treated projects
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https://www.navysbirsearch.com/?
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who failed to report were unsuccessful. This model can be viewed as the lower bound of the
intervention's impact.
3.3. Sample Selection
Population of Navy Phase II SBIR and STTR Awards
The population of Navy Phase II SBIR and STTR awards are defined as all projects
captured in the DoD commercialization database with award start dates between fiscal years 2005
and 2008. There are 1,174 such projects (Table 1). These projects constitute the eligible population
from which the treatment and comparison groups were selected.
Table 1 Population of Navy Phase II Awards

Fiscal Year

Phase II

Awards w/

Percentage

Awards

CCR Update

Captured by
CCR

2005

312

286

91.7%

2006

251

240

95.6%

2007

262

254

96.9%

2008

349

340

97.4%

Totals

1174

1120

95.4%

3.3.1. Treatment Group
The treatment group is defined as Navy TAP graduates who have provided an update to
the DoD commercialization database during the month of, or after, program completion. As seen
in Table 2, there were 664 TAP graduates between fiscal years 2005 and 2008. From this
population, 537 (81 percent) provided a post-intervention update to the DoD commercialization
database. The 127 projects who do not meet the defined criteria will be excluded from the base
modeling. Excluding these projects may lead to an over (or under) stating of the programmatic
impact.
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Table 2 Population of Navy Phase II Projects Considered for the Treatment Group (Projects that participated in
the Transition Assistance Program (TAP))

Fiscal
Year

Population TAP
of TAP
Projects
Projects
w/ CCR
Update

Percentage
Captured
by CCR

TAP w/ Post Percentage # of
Intervention of TAP in
TAP
Update
Treatment
excluded

2005

181

173

95.6%

158

91%

15

2006

150

146

97.3%

120

82%

26

2007

148

147

99.3%

113

77%

34

2008

199

198

99.5%

146

74%

52

Totals

678

664

98%

537

81%

127

As stated previously, two assumptions may be made regarding the population of excluded
projects. Under one scenario, I can assume they followed a similar pattern of success but failed to
report, which would understate the programmatic impact. Alternatively, I can assume they were
unsuccessful and chose not to report, which would overstate the programmatic impact. To protect
against the latter, I will develop a sensitivity model under the second assumption to protect against
overstating the programmatic impact. This subsequent model will serve as a lower bound for the
programmatic impact.
3.3.2. Comparison Group
The comparison group is defined as the untreated (chose not to participate in the Navy
TAP) population of Navy Phase II awards captured by the DoD commercialization database. The
comparison group population consists of 456 projects between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, as seen
in Table 3. The possibility for spillover effects between the treatment and comparison groups
exists. The Transition Assistance Program is a project level intervention, meaning, firms with
multiple Phase II awards during the period of interest may have entered only a subset of those
awards in the treatment.
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Table 3 Population of Navy Phase II Awards used for the Comparison Group

Fiscal
Year

Population of NonTAP Projects

Non-TAP Projects
w/ CCR Update

Percentage
Captured by CCR

2005

139

113

81%

2006

105

94

90%

2007

115

107

93%

2008

151

142

94%

510

456

89%

Totals

Since I posit a positive impact from the treatment (participation in the Navy TAP), I would
expect the model to quantify a probability of commercialization success higher for the treatment
group than the comparison group. However, with the presence of firm spillovers, the programmatic
impact may be understated--depending on the proportion of multiple project firms split across the
treatment and comparison groups. I subset the larger model based on firm project characteristics
to shed light on these potential spillover effects. While this sub-setting may indicate the presence
of spillover and signal the direction of their impact, fully accounting for those effects are beyond
the scope of this thesis, but it is worth noting for future research designs.
3.4. Dataset
The resulting dataset contains 993 projects, 537 in the treatment and 456 in the comparison
group. As seen in Table 4, the treatment group has a statistically significant higher percentage of
projects reporting commercialization compared to the comparison group. The treatment group also
has a statistically higher average Phase II award amount, a variable that will be included in the
model as a control. Under the lower bound scenario, I assumed that the 127 projects that
participated in the TAP, but failed to provide an update to the DoD commercialization database,
were unsuccessful. Under this assumption the difference in commercialization percentages
between the groups was reduced to 13 percentage points. The difference remains statistically
significant. This data as well as the year by year commercialization percentages for the treatment
and comparison groups can be seen in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively.
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Table 4 Selected Descriptive Statistics for Treatment and Comparison Groups

Treatment

Comparison

Difference

Sample Size (n)

537

456

81

Number Commercialized

390

212

178

Commercialization

73%

46%

26%*

Total Commercialization

$806,245,836

$465,414,980

$340,830,856

Commercialization Average

$1,501,389

$1,020,647

$480,742

Phase II Award Average

$1,001,644

$879,468

$122,176*

Percentage

Phase II Sponsoring Component Project Distribution
MARCOR

4%

4%

NAVAIR

41%

42%

NAVFAC

0%

1%

NAVSEA

24%

21%

NAVSUP

0%

0%

NSMA

1%

1%

ONR

24%

25%

OSD

0%

0%

SPAWAR

6%

4%

SSP

0%

1%

*Significant at .05 level.
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Table 5 Number of Projects and Commercialization Percentages by FY (Treatment and Comparison Groups)

Fiscal Year

Treatment

Commercialization Comparison

Commercialization

Percentage

Percentage

2005

158

77%

113

53%

2006

120

73%

94

52%

2007

113

73%

107

45%

2008

146

66%

142

39%

Totals

537

73%

456

46%

3.4.1. Descriptive Analysis of Dataset
As seen in Table 4, the resulting dataset indicates differences in the means across a number
of variables. This section takes a closer look at these variables and describes their role in the
regression model.
3.4.2. Phase II Award Amount
I believe projects receiving higher levels of funding are better positioned to develop their
technology, which may in turn move them closer to a product, or make them more attractive to
outside investors. Based on this belief, I hypothesize that the level of Phase II project funding has
a positive impact on the probability of commercialization. The distribution of Phase II award
amounts between the treatment and comparison groups can be seen in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 Phase II Award Amounts: Treatment versus Comparison

As seen in the figure inset, the treatment group (TAP=1) has a median Phase II award amount
of $749,997 compared to a median award level of $749,624 for the comparison cohort, a difference
of a little more than $300. This isn’t surprising because, during the fiscal years covered, the SBIR
policy guidelines provided a $750,000 soft cap for Phase II awards. Processes were in place to
allow agencies to exceed those aforementioned guidelines, which is reflected in the comparison of
Phase II award averages.
The average Phase II award for treatment projects is slightly greater than $1 million, compared
to just under $880 thousand for the comparison group. The differences between the two
populations can be seen in the box plot presented in Figure 4. While both populations share the
same median location, the third quartile and upper limits are more extended for the treatment
group. The treatment group also contains a larger concentration of outliers on the higher end of
the scale, including the two highest Phase II award projects, both receiving close to $6 million.

30

Figure 4 Boxplot of Phase II Award Amount: TAP versus Non-TAP

The net difference between the cohorts in average Phase II award funding is $122,000,
which is statistically significance at the 95 percent level. I will include Phase II award funding in
the regression model.
3.4.3. Number of Employees
It is unclear the impact, if any, the size of the SBIR firm has on project commercialization
outcomes. I anticipate that the smaller firms, when measured by number of employees, may have
a more difficult time commercializing their SBIR technology. They may not have sufficient
staffing to address their market research or business development needs. To explore this impact, I
included the number of employees at the time the firm submitted their SBIR Phase II proposal.
The distribution of employees between the cohorts can be seen in Figure 5.
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Figure 5 Distribution of # of Employees: TAP versus Non-TAP

Projects opting not to participate in the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) tend to be
larger when measured by number of employees. The comparison group has a median number of
employees of 33, and an average of 66. Both measures are higher than the treatment group, which
has a median number of employees of 21, and a mean of 43.5. Close to 60 percent of the projects
in the treatment group are from firms will less than 30 employees, compared to less than 50 percent
for the comparison group. Figure 6 displays a boxplot of the number of employees for both the
treatment and comparison groups.
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Figure 6 Boxplot of Number of Employees TAP vs. Non-TAP

As seen in the boxplot, firms with more than 100 employees are considered an outlier within
the treatment cohort, while, the comparison group’s outliers begin around 200 employees. The
difference in mean number of employees between the subpopulations is statistically significant at
the 95 percent level. I will include number of employees in the model to understand if the success
probability changes with size (as measured by number of employees).
3.4.4. Geographic Location
The distribution of projects contained in this dataset originates from 48 of the 50 states, as
seen in Figure 7. Lerner (1999) found that SBIR awardees based in zip codes with substantial
venture capital activity experienced superior growth compared to their counterparts. Recognizing
that geographic location may impact project commercialization, I compressed the states into the
four U.S. Census based regions—West, South, Midwest, and Northeast—and include them as an
exploratory dummy variable in the model.
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Figure 7 Distribution by State of Navy Phase II Awards w/in Dataset (2004-2008)

3.4.5. Funding Component
The systems commands within the Navy represent various functional responsibilities,
technological interests, and resources. The implications of these variations and impact on SBIR
project outcomes are unclear. I explore differences in success probabilities by adding sponsoring
components as an exploratory dummy variable to the model.
3.5. Research Design Summary
I hypothesize that commercialization assistance programs increase the probability of
commercial outcomes of SBIR Phase II projects. Utilizing secondary data sources, I have
developed a treatment group comprised on the population of Navy Transition Assistance Program
(TAP) participants who provided commercialization updates following program completion, and
a comparison group from the population of projects who were eligible but chose not to participate
in the Navy Transition Assistance Program. The resulting sample is 993 projects, 537 in the
treatment group, and 456 in a comparison group, a sufficiently sized sample to test my hypothesis.
This project will quantify the impact participation in commercialization assistance programs has
on the on the odds of success and the estimated success probabilities, subject to the other control
variables (i.e., Award amount, Number of employees, Geography, and Sponsoring component).
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The results will help policy makers and program managers explore commercialization assistance
as a policy option to enhance commercialization outcomes.

4. Developing the Model
Probability (commercialization) = f(Technical Assistance; Controls)
4.1. Dependent Variable: Commercialization
The dependent variable is project level commercialization, which is appropriate given the
project level intervention of the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). Commercialization
has been consistently defined as sales or non-SBIR additional development funding related to the
SBIR award (General Accounting Office, 1992; National Research Council, 2003; and National
Research Council, 2008). The purpose of the Navy Transition Assistance Program is to increase
the likelihood of participants receiving Phase III (non-SBIR) funding. Given this goal, I decided
to use project level commercialization as a binary instead of a continuous variable. Descriptively,
the cumulative commercialization outcomes of TAP participants are on average $480 thousand
higher than non-participants (see Table 4). While the cumulative commercialization outcomes are
important to demonstrate a return on investment from federal expenditures on research and
development; given the emphasis of the TAP—orienting firms to seek commercialization—I
believe the percentage of projects successfully securing funding is a more appropriate
measurement. This project will represent commercialization as a dichotomous variable taking the
value of 1, if the project reported any non-SBIR funding, and 0 otherwise.
4.2. Explanatory Variable: Transition Assistance Program
I posit that participation in the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program increases the
probability of project commercialization success. To test this hypothesis I included a dichotomous
explanatory variable taking the value of 1 if the project is in the treatment group (Navy TAP
participant) and a 0 otherwise (comparison).
4.3. Control Variables
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Phase II Award Amount: I hypothesize that the level of Phase II project funding has a
positive impact on the probability of commercialization. I believe projects receiving higher levels
of funding are better positioned to develop their technology, and in turn may be closer to a product
or more attractive to outside investors.
Number of Employees: I will include the number of employees at the time of award as an
exploratory variable. I do not posit a relationship; however, given the differences in size between
the treatment and comparison groups, I will add the variable to explore if success probabilities
vary based on firm size characteristics.
Geographic location: I do not posit a relationship to geographic location, but will add
regional location as an exploratory dummy variable to ascertain if geographic differences impact
project commercialization outcomes.
Sponsoring Components: variation in resources and authority vary across the Navy's
sponsoring components. While I do not posit a direction or magnitude of impact, I do propose
exploring potential differences in sponsoring components commercialization outcomes.

5. Treatment versus Comparison: Odds of Success
The primary focus of this research is to assess the impact participation in the Navy’s
Transition Assistance Program (TAP), a commercialization assistance program, has on the
probability of project commercialization success. To that end the principal explanatory variable is
a dichotomous participation variable, taking the value of 1 if the project is in the treatment group
(participated in the TAP), and a 0 otherwise. To measure this impact I am utilizing available data
on projects who chose to participate in the program (treatment group) and those who were eligible
but chose not to participate (comparison group), to identify if statistically significant differences
exist in the groups odds of success.
5.1. Treatment as a Single Predictor of Success
Although it would be a rather large assumption to assume the only relevant differences
between the treatment and comparison groups was their participation in the Navy Transition
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Assistance Program (TAP), I see value in developing a single predictor model to the measure the
impact of the TAP prior to including the control variables. This cross classification process can
indicate the presence and significance of any differences between the two groups solely as it relates
to being in the treatment or comparison group.
The 2x2 contingency table I developed based on the population of observations can be seen
in Table 6. The table classifies commercialization success across the treatment and comparison
groups. The table was set up with the participation variable as the explanatory variable and
commercialization as the response. As seen in Table 6, the proportion of the treatment group
reporting commercialization success is 390/537, or .73. Meaning seven-out-of-ten of the projects
participating in the Navy TAP reported some level of non-SBIR commercialization funding
following program completion. Just under half of the projects in the comparison group reported
commercialization success (212/456, or .46). The difference in success proportions between the
treatment and comparison groups is .26, with an estimated standard of error of .0656.
Table 6 Treatment versus Comparison 2x2 Contingency Table

Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise)
1

0

Total

Navy TAP (Treatment- 1)

390

147

537

Non-TAP (Comparison - 0)

212

244

456

602

391

993

Group

Total

Based on the point estimate of .26 for the difference in sample proportions and a standard
error of .0656, I am 95 percent confident that the difference in success proportion for the treatment
compared to the comparison is at least 13 percent and at most 39 percent higher. Meaning a
significant difference exists between the treatment and the comparison groups, with the treatment
having a greater proportion of projects reporting commercialization.
While the percentage difference between the sample proportions may not appear highly
impactful, a closer examination of the odds of success between the treatment and comparison
groups makes clearer the impact of the Navy Transition Assistance Program. The estimated odds
of commercialization success given that a project participated in the TAP is 3.05 times the
estimated odds of those in the comparison group. I can be 95 percent confident that the estimated
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probability of commercialization success for the treatment is at least 2.34 times, to at most 3.97
times, the comparison group. Assuming the sole explanation for commercialization outcome
differences between Navy TAP participants and the comparison is the intervention, the Navy TAP
participants estimated odds of success would be at least double the projects in the comparison
group.
5.1.2. Model Results: Predicted Success Probabilities
Using the dichotomous treatment explanatory variable as a single predictor indicated that
graduates of the Transition Assistance Program estimated odds of success were 3.05 times the
estimated of odds of success for non-participating projects. This method of analysis does not
account for potential differences in outcomes based on other variables. To explore this possibility,
I ran a logistical regression model on the 993 observations in the dataset incorporating the control
variables as explained in section 4. The Odds Ratio estimates resulting from this model can be
seen in Table 7.
Table 7 Logistical regression: Commercialization Success TAP versus Non-TAP (n=993)

Parameter

Odds Ratio

Standard Error

Estimate

95% Confidence
Interval

Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP)

2.768****

0.1394

(2.109, 3.643)

lnawardamount

2.130****

0.1591

(1.568, 2.929)

NumEmployee

0.997***

.000949

(0.995, 0.999)

Region_Midwest vs. South

1.346

0.2453

(0.836, 2.191)

Region_Northeast vs. South

1.244

0.1745

(0.884, 1.753)

Region_West vs. South

1.230

0.1813

(0.863, 1.757)

Component_MARCOR vs. Other

0.532

0.5386

(0.182, 1.519)

Component_NAVAIR vs. Other

0.466*

0.4406

(0.191, 1.089)

Component_NAVSEA vs. Other

0.606

0.4521

(0.243, 1.449)

Component_ONR vs. Other

0.593

0.4457

(0.240, 1.401)

Component_SPAWAR vs. Other

0.515

0.5405

(0.175, 1.477)

Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001.

As seen in Table 7, neither the regional or component dummy parameters are significant,
except for the NAVAIR component (at an alpha of .10). Although the continuous variable for the
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number of employees is significant at a 99 percent level of confidence, the confidence interval for
the odds ratio provides a statistically insignificant result. In lieu of these findings, I removed the
regional and component variables, and compressed the continuous number of employees into an
ordinal variable. The updated model results are displayed in Table 8.
Table 8 Reduced Logistical regression results for commercialization of TAP versus Non-TAP Participants (n=993)

Parameter

Odds Ratio

Standard

95% Confidence

Error

Interval

Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP)

2.753****

0.1390

(2.099, 3.621)

lnawardamount

1.992****

0.1531

(1.483, 2.706)

Nemploy (1 vs. 5)

3.74***

0.4099

(1.719, 8.699)

Nemploy (2 vs. 5)

4.162***

0.4323

(1.827, 10.079)

Nemploy (3 vs. 5)

3.284***

0.4228

(1.47, 7.821)

Nemploy (4 vs. 5)

2.69**

0.4809

(1.068, 7.116)

Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001.

The updated model shows that while holding other variables constant, the odds of
commercialization success for a Navy TAP project are 2.75 times the odds of success for a project
in the comparison group. Adding additional variables (natural log of Phase II award size) and the
bracketed number of employees impacted the odds ratio. Using the treatment as the sole predictor
resulted in an odds ratio of 3.05, while the fuller model resulted in an odds ratio of 2.75. To
understand the impact of the treatment across firm and project award sizes, I calculated the
estimated probability of success for a project with a median Phase II award amount ($749,949)
across the firm size brackets. The Navy TAP graduates held a higher predicted probability of
success across the size dimensions. The full results can be seen in Table 9.
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Table 9 Estimated Success Probabilities by Firm Size and Median Phase II Award ($749,949): TAP versus Non-TAP

Estimated Success Probability
Firm Size

TAP

Non-TAP

Nemploy (<25)

72%

48%

Nemploy (25 to 49)

74%

51%

Nemploy (50 to 149)

69%

45%

Nemploy (150 to 249)

65%

40%

Nemploy (250+)

41%

20%

5.2. Unique Firms
Although my focus is to isolate project level commercialization outcomes as a function of
participating in the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP), differences amongst firms’
success winning SBIR Phase II awards could potentially impact results. Reviewing the
composition of firms in the dataset reveals that the 993 projects are represented by 557 unique
firms. Figure 8 displays a histogram of the number of projects won by unique firms.

Unique Firm Breakouts
400

379

350

# of Firms

300
250
200
127

150
100
50

28

23

4-5

6+

0
1

2-3

# of Projects

Figure 8 Firm Demographics Overall Dataset

As seen in the histogram, 379 out of the 557 unique firms (68 percent) won a single project
during the years of interest. However, the cumulative number of projects from these firms
represents 38 percent of the projects contained in the dataset. This shows a high concentration of
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repeat winners within the Navy SBIR program. In contrast, firms winning two or more awards
during the period of interest account for 62 percent of all projects. To understand the implications
of this distribution, the proportion of successes and total commercialization funding was found for
both the single project and the multiple project firms, and analyzed for statistical differences
between the groups. This information can be seen in Table 10.
Table 10 Proportion of Success amongst Firms: Single Project Winners vs. Multiple Project Winners

Commercialization Success (1-Reported Funding, 0-Otherwise)
Group

Single Project Firms

# of

# of

Commercialization

Total

Firms

Projects

Percentage

Commercialization

379

379

53%

$362,148,069

Multiple Project Firms
2-3 Projects

127

284

66%

$398,496,878

4-5 Projects

28

124

71%

$100,921,198

6+ Projects

23

206

60%

$410,094,671

178

614

65%

$909,512,747

557

993

61%

$1,271,660,816

Multiple Project Firms
Totals
Totals

There is nearly a 12 percentage point difference in the proportion of success for multiple
award winners compared to single project firms overall. It is also evident that less than 5 percent
of the unique companies (23 companies winning 6+ projects) account for nearly a third (32
percent) of all reported commercialization funding. This finding is not unique. It was found that
the 7 percent of firms winning the most Phase II awards accounted for 60 percent of SBIR
commercialization (National Research Council, 2008, p. 156). The prevalence of concentrated
success amongst a small subset of repeat winners is characteristic of the SBIR and STTR programs,
and not specific to the Navy or the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). Nonetheless, to
understand if the probability of success changes given these firm characteristics, I developed
separate contingency tables for the two subsets and analyzed their odds of success.
5.3. Single Project Firms
As stated previously, 557 unique firms won the 993 projects contained in this dataset.
Although 68 percent of the firms represented in the dataset are unique, the distribution of projects
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amongst unique firms is skewed. This section explores the proportion of success amongst the 379
single project firms based on their exposure, or lack thereof, to the treatment. As seen in Table 11,
52 percent of single-firm projects were exposed to the Navy TAP.
Table 11 Firm w/ Single Project Contingency Table

Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise)
1

Singe Project Firms

0

Percentage
of Projects

Navy TAP (Treatment)

67%

33%

52%

Non-TAP (Comparison)

38%

62%

48%

53%

47%

Total

Cross classifying these subsets based on commercialization outcomes across the treatment
and comparison groups reveals that those exposed to the Navy TAP had a success proportion of
.67. The proportion of projects in the comparison group reporting commercialization is .38. The
difference in success proportions between the treatment and comparison groups is .29, with an
estimated standard error of .0491. I am 95 percent confident that the difference in success
proportion for the treatment compared to the comparison is at least 19 percent and at most 39
percent higher. Within the subset of single project firms, a significant difference exists between
the treatment and the comparison group, with the treatment having a greater proportion of projects
reporting commercialization. The estimated odds of commercialization success given that a project
within this subset participated in the TAP is 3.3 times the estimated odds of those in the comparison
group. I can be 95 percent confident that the estimated probability of commercialization success
for the treatment are at least 2.2 times to at most 5 times those of the comparison group. Single
project firms that participated in the Navy TAP estimated odds of success are at least double those
in the comparison group.
5.3.1. Single Project Firms Model
The dataset contains 993 project level observations represented by 557 unique firms. A
subset of those firms had a single project during the period of interest, allowing comparisons
without any concerns of spillover impacts from firms with multiple projects. I ran a separate
logistical regression model based on this subset of one-time winners. Reducing the model in this
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manner made the number of employees insignificant, and thus it was removed. The model results
can be seen in Table 12.
Table 12 Logistical regression results for Single Project Firms for TAP versus Non-TAP Participants (n=379)

Parameter

Odds Ratio

Standard Error

95% Confidence
Interval

Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP)
lnawardamount

3.025****

0.2190

(1.976, 4.666)

1.908**

0.2528

(1.178, 3.186)

Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001.

For the subset of single-winning firms, the model indicates that the estimated odds for
success are 3.03 times the odds of success for a project in the comparison group, slightly lower
than if the TAP was used as the sole predictor of success (3.3). The probability of success estimate
for a median sized Phase II project ($749,949) participating in the TAP is 65 percent compared to
38 percent for a comparison project. Amongst the subset of single-project firms, without concerns
of spillover effects, the estimated odds of success are at least double the odds of success for projects
in the comparison group.
5.4. Multiple Project Firms
A subset of firms (178) accounted for 62 percent of the sample projects. As discussed
previously, the success proportion of this cohort relative to the single project firms was statistically
significant, with the multiple project firms reporting a higher proportion of success. The presence
of multiple-award winners can indicate endogenous firm factors as a possible explanation of
success. The characteristics that have allowed these firms to win multiple Phase II awards, may
also contribute to, or drive, their commercialization success. These firms further complicate the
understanding of programmatic impact due to the possibility of spillover effects. Since the Navy
TAP is a project level intervention, not all of a firm’s projects may be exposed to the treatment;
however, to the extent that transferable learning occurs, the benefits of a single project could
impact the outcomes of others. The potential for spillovers effects can be seen in Figure 9.
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Multiple Project Firms and Program Participation
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Figure 9 Multiple Project Firms

The graph looks at project participation by firms with multiple projects. The combination
cluster shows that 71 multiple project firms split their projects by entering at least one of them in
the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). These 71 firms won 4.6 projects, on average,
during the period covered. They cumulatively accounted for 328, or a third of all, projects. Their
decision to enter a subset of projects into the treatment reinforces the possibility of spillovers;
however, a full analytic accounting of such impact is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Of the multiple project firms, 107 made the decision to enter all or none of their projects
into the Navy Transition Assistance Program. These subsets provide some insight into if
commercialization outcomes amongst multi-project firms are impacted by participation in the
program. The earlier analysis of multiple project firms, irrespective of program participation,
demonstrated that they featured a higher proportion of success compared to single project firms.
To measure the TAP impact amongst this group, I cross classified the subset of firms that entered
all, or none, of their projects in the TAP. This eliminates concerns regarding spillovers based on a
firm entering a subset of their projects. This classification can be seen in Table 13.
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Table 13 Firm w/ Multiple Projects Contingency Table

Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise)
Multiple Project Firms

# of Firms

1

0

Total Projects

TAP Only (Treatment )

71

138

42

180

Non-TAP Only (Comparison)

36

50

56

106

107

188

98

286

Total

The multiple project TAP-Only firms (firm entered all of their eligible projects in the Navy
TAP) have a success proportion of 138/180, or .77, compared to a success proportion of 50/106,
or .47 for the comparison group (multiple project winners who did not enter any of their projects
in the TAP). The difference in success proportions between the treatment and comparison groups
is .30, with an estimated standard of error of .0577. Analysis of this subset of multiple project firms
demonstrates a statistically significant difference between the treatment and comparison groups.
The estimated odds of commercialization success given that a project within this subset
participated in the TAP is 3.7 times the estimated odds of those in the comparison group. I can be
95 percent confident that the estimated probability of commercialization success for the treatment
is at least 2.2 times to at most 6.2 times those of the comparison group.
5.4.1. Multiple Project Firms Model: TAP-ONLY vs. Non-TAP ONLY
Amongst the multiple project firms, 107 of them made the decision to solely enter their
projects into the TAP, or to entirely bypass the program during the period of interest. There were
180 projects represented by 71 unique firms that entered all of their eligible projects into a
Transition Assistance Program, compared to 106 projects represented by 36 unique firms who
bypassed the program entirely. A logistical regression model, similar to the one for one-time
participants, was run to understand if multiple winning firms muted the impact of the Transition
Assistance Program (TAP). Based on the model results, the TAP cohort featured 3.6 times the
odds of success when compared to the comparison group. The results of the model can be seen in
Table 14.
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Table 14 Logistical regression results for Multple Project Firms w/o program overlap (n=286)

Parameter

Odds Ratio

Standard

95% Confidence

Error

Interval

Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP)

3.581****

0.2651

(2.139, 6.060)

lnawardamount

1.871**

0.2714

(1.112, 3.256)

Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001.

5.4.2. Multiple Project Firms: Potential Spillover Effects
Another subset of multiple project firms split their projects between the treatment and
comparison groups. While the underlying rationale for the decision to enter certain projects in the
program over others is unclear, the results of that decision could serve as an indicator of
intervention spillover effects. Thus far the analysis has consistently shown a higher proportion of
success for the treatment compared to the comparison. Examining this subset can reveal if the
impact is muted or eliminated. The success outcomes of the 71 firms who decided to split projects
between the treatment and comparison can be seen in Table 15.
Table 15 Firm w/ Multiple Projects Split Between Treatment and Comparison

Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise)
Multiple Project Firms

1

0

TAP Only (Treatment )

75%

25%

49%

Non-TAP Only (Comparison)

55%

45%

51%

65%

35%

Total

Percentage of Projects

As seen in the table, the projects that were exposed to the treatment have a success
proportion of .75, compared to a success proportion of .55 for the comparison group. The
difference in success proportions between the treatment and comparison groups is .19, with an
estimated standard of error of .0514. The difference is significant and a 95 percent confidence
interval indicates that the proportion for the treatment is at least 9 percent and at most 29 percent
higher than the comparison.
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Although less pronounced than previous analysis, this subset still demonstrates a
statistically significant difference between the projects in the treatment and comparison groups.
The estimated odds of commercialization success given that a project within this subset
participated in the TAP is 2.4 times the estimated odds of those in the comparison group.
Constructing a 95 percent confidence interval around this point estimate means the estimated
probability of commercialization success for the treatment is at least 1.5 times to at most 3.8 times
those of the comparison group.
5.5. Multiple Project Firms Model: Potential Spillover Effects
Thus far the analysis has demonstrated a consistent pattern of increased odds of success for
Navy TAP participants compared to their counterparts. The potential exists within the dataset for
potential spillover effects since many firms have projects across both the treated and comparison
groups. Given my hypothesis that the Navy TAP has a positive impact on the probability of
commercialization, if spillover effects exist, I would anticipate that the odds of success will be
lessened for the subset of multiple project firms that split their project participation. To test this
effect, I subset the data based on 71 firms, representing 328 projects, distributed across both the
treatment and the comparison groups. The model results can be seen in Table 16.
Table 16 Potential Spillover – Multiple Project Firms Split Participation in TAP and Comparison (n=328)

Parameter

Odds

Standard Error

95% Confidence

Ratio

Interval

Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP)

2.159***

0.2490

(1.330, 3.535)

lnawardamount

2.088***

0.2761

(1.232, 3.654)

Nemploy (1 vs 5)

5.327**

0.6534

(1.480, 19.171)

Nemploy (2 vs 5)

6.592***

0.6765

(1.751, 24.822)

Nemploy (3 vs 5)

4.847**

0.6436

(1.373, 17.112)

Nemploy (4 vs 5)

3.231*

0.7035

(0.814, 12.828)

Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001.

Based on the model results, the potential for spillover effects exists. While the Navy TAP
participants maintain higher odds of success (2.16) compared to the comparison group, the odds
are closer than any of the previous models explored. While the findings as they relate to spillovers
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cannot be deemed definitive, the muted impact amongst these crossover firms can serve as a
stepping stone for more in-depth exploration of the potential spillover.
To understand the impact of the treatment across firm size and project award sizes, I
calculated the estimated probability of success for a project with a median Phase II award amount
($749,949) across the firm size brackets. The Navy TAP graduates held a higher predicted
probability across the size brackets. The full results can be seen in Table 17.
Table 17 Estimated Success Probabilities (Spillover) by Firm Size and Median Phase II Award ($749,949): TAP versus
Non-TAP

Estimated Success Probability
Firm Size

TAP

Non-TAP

Nemploy (<25)

75%

58%

Nemploy (25 to 49)

79%

63%

Nemploy (50 to 149)

73%

56%

Nemploy (150 to 249)

64%

45%

Nemploy (250+)

36%

20%

6. Sensitivity Analysis
6.1. The Lower Bound
Cross classification is also useful in measuring the lower bound of TAP impact. While
developing the dataset I observed 127 projects that participated in the Navy Transition Assistance
Program, but did not provide an update to the DoD Commercialization database following program
conclusion. These projects were excluded from the final dataset. If one assumes that these projects
did not provide an update because they were unsuccessful, then the impact of the treatment versus
the comparison group would be overestimated. To protect against this scenario I assume that these
projects were unsuccessful, and reanalyze the data. If the TAP projects still demonstrate higher
odds of success, the resulting odds ratio can serve as a conservative lower bound estimate of the
programmatic impact.
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Table 18 Lower Bound 2x2 Contingency Table

Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise)
1

Group

0

Percentage
of Projects

Navy TAP (Treatment)

59%

41%

59%

Non-TAP (Comparison)

46%

54%

41%

54%

46%

Total

Table 18 displays the updated cross classification which increased the number of
unsuccessful treatment projects. The original dataset indicated a proportion of success of .73 for
the treated firms, after updating the data to reflect this lower bound estimate, this proportion was
reduced to .59. This updated figure still compares favorably to the comparison group which had a
success proportion of .47. The updated difference in success proportions between the treatment
and comparison groups is .12, with an estimated standard of error of .0302. Based on this
information, I am 95 percent confident that the difference between the treatment and the
comparison group is at least 6 percent and at most 18 percent higher. This means that at the lower
bound, a significant difference still exists between the treatment and the comparison group, with
the treatment maintaining a greater proportion of commercialization success.
It is clear that the magnitude of impact between the treatment and the comparison group is
less pronounced. In the original dataset the treatment group had a 3 to 1 probability of success
compared to the comparison group. Under the lower-bound scenario, the odds drop to a point
estimate of 1.64 times the odds of the comparison group. Constructing a 95 percent confidence
interval under this scenario shows the odds estimate ranges from 1.29 to 2.08. So under the more
conservative evaluation of programmatic impact, I can be 95 percent confident that the probability
of commercialization success is at least 29 percent higher, and at most double, the odds of success
for the comparison group.
7. Summary of Results
7.1. Probability of Commercialization Success
Commercialization (private sector or Non-SBIR funding) of federally sponsored
innovations is a key congressionally mandated goal of the Small Business Innovation Research
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(SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. While much attention has
focused on quantifying and assessing the commercial outputs of the SBIR program, limited
research exists on the impact business advisory support initiatives have on project
commercialization. These programs, such as the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP),
seek to augment the business capacity of SBIR/STTR award recipients by providing information
and resources focused on facilitating the commercialization process. I employed a logistic
regression model to examine commercialization outcomes from participants and non-participants
in the Navy's Transition Assistance Program (TAP). A dataset comprised of 993 Navy Phase II
projects awarded between 2005 and 2008 was used to populate the model. The self-reported
commercialization outcomes contained in the dataset include 537 Navy TAP projects, and a
comparison group of 456 Navy Phase II projects who opted not to participate in the program during
the years covered. The resulting analysis found that the odds of success given that a project
participated in the Navy TAP ranged from 1.5 to 6.2 times the odds of success for a nonparticipating project, depending upon firm characteristics (a summary of results can be seen in
Table 19).
Based on the 95 percent confidence intervals from the respective models, the odds of
success given that a project participated in the Navy TAP range from a high of 6.2 to a low of 1.5,
depending upon firm characteristics. The full model which uses the entire 993 projects without
any subsets indicates that the odds of success for TAP projects are 2.3 to 4 times the odds of
success for non-participating firms. For the subset of single-winning firms, the model indicates
that the estimated odds for success are 3.03 times the odds of success for a project in the
comparison group. Stated differently, the model results indicate that for a Navy Phase II project
with less than 25 employees, and a median sized Phase II ($749,949) the estimated probability of
success would be 65 percent, if they participated in the Navy TAP. If a project with the same
characteristics chose not to participate in the Navy TAP, its success probability will fall to 38
percent. Amongst the subset of projects who were either entirely exposed to the treatment, or fully
opted out of the program, the odds of success for those exposed to the Navy TAP are at least double
the projects in the comparison group.
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Table 19 Summary of Model Results: TAP versus Non-TAP

Model Results: TAP versus Non-TAP Commercialization Success Estimates
Model Description

Odds Ratio
(TAP as Single
Predictor)
3.05

95 %
Confidence
Interval
(2.3 to 4.0)

Single Project Firms
(n=379)

3.3

(2.2 to 5.0)

Multiple Projects
Firms: TAP-Only vs.
NON-TAP Only
(n=286)

3.7

(2.1 to 6.2)

Multiple Project Firms:
Projects Split across
Treatment/Comparison
(Potential Spillover,
n=328)

2.4

(1.5 to 3.8)

Sensitivity Analysis:

1.64

(1.29 to

Full Model (n=933)

The Lower Bound

Logistic Model Specification/ TAP Odds
Ratio/Probability of Success
݈ݐ݅݃ሾܲሺܻ = 1ሻሿ = ሺ−10.7095 + 1.0127ሺܽݐሻ +
.6891ሺ݈݊ܽ݁ݖ݅ݏ݀ݎܽݓሻ + 1.3190ሺ< ݁݁ݕ݈݉ܧ
25ሻ
Odds Ratio = 2.75
Probability of Success TAP is 72%; Non-TAP is
48%
(at median award size ($749,949), and less than 25
employees)
݈ݐ݅݃ሾܲሺܻ = 1ሻሿ = ሺ−9.2193 + 1.1070ሺܽݐሻ +
.6463ሺ݈݊ܽ݁ݖ݅ݏ݀ݎܽݓሻሻ
Odds Ratio = 3.03
Probability of Success TAP is 65%; Non-TAP is
38%
(at median award size ($749,949))
݈ݐ݅݃ሾܲሺܻ = 1ሻሿ = ሺ−8.6350 + 1.2757ሺܽݐሻ +
.6267ሺ݈݊ܽ݁ݖ݅ݏ݀ݎܽݓሻሻ
Odds Ratio = 3.58
Probability of Success TAP is 75%; Non-TAP is
46%
(at median award size ($749,949))
݈ݐ݅݃ሾܲሺܻ = 1ሻሿ = ሺ−11.3173 + .7694ሺܽݐሻ +
.7363ሺ݈݊ܽ݁ݖ݅ݏ݀ݎܽݓሻ + 1.6728ሺ< ݁݁ݕ݈݉ܧ
25ሻ
Odds Ratio = 2.16
Probability of Success TAP is 75%; Non-TAP is
58%
(at median award size ($749,949), and less than 25
employees)

2.08)

(n=1120)

The 993 projects in the dataset was represented by 557 unique firms, meaning a subset of
firms had multiple projects during the years covered. Specifically, 178 firms accounted for 62
percent of the projects within the dataset. These multiple award winners have close to a 12
percentage point difference in the proportion of successful firms compared to single project firms
overall. It is also evident that less than 5 percent of the unique companies (23 companies winning
6+ projects) account for nearly a third (32 percent) of all reported commercialization funding. This
finding is not unique, it is consistent with previous findings on multiple award winners and
commercialization outcomes. The National Research Council found that 60 percent of SBIR
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commercialization resulted from the 7 percent of firms winning the most awards (National
Research Council, 2008, p. 156). The prevalence of concentrated success amongst a small subset
of repeat winners is characteristic of the SBIR and STTR programs, and not specific to this dataset
or the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP).
I ran two models focusing on these multiple project firms. The first model was populated
by multiple project firms entering either all of their projects, or none of their projects, in the Navy
TAP. This subset featured the highest model based odds ratio, indicating that projects exposed to
the TAP are 3.6 times more likely to be successful than their counterparts. These models (single
project firms, and TAP-Only versus Non-TAP multiple project firms) do not have to deal with
potential spillover effects because there are no firm overlaps between the treatment and
comparison groups. Without concerns of spillover, the odds of success given that a project
participated in the TAP is estimated to be at least 3 times the odds of success of a project that did
not participate in the program, and at least double based on the lower bound of the 95 percent
confidence interval.
My analysis has demonstrated a consistent pattern of increased odds of success for Navy
TAP participants compared to their counterparts. The potential exists within the dataset for
spillover effects since multiple firms have projects across both the treated and comparison groups.
Since I hypothesize that the TAP has a positive impact on the probability of commercialization, if
spillover effects exist, I would anticipate that the odds of success will be lessened for firms with
projects distributed across the treatment and comparison groups. To test this effect, I subset the
data set based on 71 firms, representing 328 projects, distributed across both the treatment and the
comparison groups. Based on the model results, the potential for spillover effects exists. While the
Navy TAP participants maintain higher odds of success (2.16) compared to the comparison group,
the odds of the success are closer than any of the previous models explored. While the findings as
they relate to spillovers cannot be deemed definitive, the muted impact amongst these crossover
firms can serve as a stepping stone for more in-depth exploration of the potential spillover.
7.2. Cost Benefit and Cost Effectiveness
The Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP) represents a cost effective way for both
increasing the magnitude of commercialization success and probability of commercialization
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success (the number of successes). As described earlier in Table 4, on average Navy TAP projects
reported close to $500,000 more in commercialization than their non-participating counterparts. A
streamlined cost-benefit analysis, using the agency per project TAP expenditures as the primary
cost, and the marginal difference between TAP and Non-TAP commercialization outcomes, I
found a cost benefit ratio of 37.9. As seen in Table 20, the 537 projects that participated in the
Navy TAP exceeded the non-TAP projects total commercialization by a present value of $292.3
million, representing a net present value of $284.5 million. The Navy investment in the Transition
Assistance Program (TAP) has generated approximately $38 in commercialization outcomes, per
dollar invested, and has a net benefit of $284.5 million.
Table 20 Navy TAP Cost Benefit Analysis

Cost Benefit Analysis
Costs (Present Value (PV) at r = 3%)
Portfolio Participation Costs (PV)

$7,719,433

Benefits (PV at r = 3%)
Cumulative Difference in Commercialization10

$292,250,682
$284,531,249

Net Present Value (NPV)

37.9

Benefit-Cost Ratio

The Navy TAP also increases the probability of success, or stated differently, generates
more successes than one would expect absent the program. As seen in the descriptive statistics of
the dataset (described earlier in Table 4) using non-participant outcomes as the status quo, one
would expect 46 successes per 100 SBIR Phase II awards in the absence of the Transition
Assistance Program. Given the results of TAP participants, I would expect twenty-seven (27)
additional successes (or 73 successes per 100 participating projects). This marginal increase
represents a cost to the agency, simplified for these purposes, as the per project participation cost
of approximately $15,000 per project (National Research Council, 2007). As seen in Table 21,

10

I utilized a 3 percent social discount rate and assumed a delay between agency investment and
commercialization outcomes. I anticipated commercialization occurring in year 4 (60% of expected
commercialization) and year 5 (40% of commercialization).
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based on these per project costs and anticipated outcomes, the cost to generate an additional
successful project is $55,556.
Table 21 TAP Cost Effectiveness Analysis per Additional Success

Cost Effectiveness Analysis
Successes per 100 Non-TAP projects

46

Successes per 100 TAP projects

73

Marginal increase in successful projects given TAP

27

Total cost per 100 TAP projects ($15K x 100)

$1,500,000
$55,556

Total cost per additional success
Average TAP Commercialization (r = 3%)

$1,318,423

Net Present Value (r = 3%)

$1,262,868
23.73

Present Value Benefit-Cost Ratio

This cost effectiveness ratio of $55,600 per additional success is offset by the expected
increase in commercialization. Simplifying the anticipated outcome as the known (present value)
average commercialization of a Navy TAP project, I anticipate each additional success beyond the
status quo, would generate $1.32 million in commercialization. The net present value per
additional success is $1.26 million, and the present value benefit cost ratio is approximately 24.
So utilizing the Navy TAP as a policy tool to increase the number of successful projects will cost
federal agencies $55,600 per additional success; however, they can expect a return of
approximately $24 per dollar invested.
Cost effectiveness analysis is a useful tool for federal policy makers when deciding how
best to allocate the tax payer resources. The Navy investments in the TAP has had an overall costbenefit ratio of 37.9, indicating an effective use of resources as measured by the increased
generation of commercialization. It also appears, that the program is an effectiveness investment
in not only maximizing the magnitude of commercialization dollars relative to the status-quo (nonTAP outcomes), but also in creating successes that otherwise would not have occurred. It costs the
Navy, through the TAP, close to $56,000 to generate a success that otherwise would not have
occurred. This per success investment is easily offset, as it is anticipated that those additional
successes will generate $1.3 million in commercialization, for a cost-benefit return of $24 per
dollar invested.
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8. Areas for Additional Research
This project focused specifically on the odds of success given that a project participated in
the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). Award recipients from acquisition agencies have
the dual opportunity of commercializing their federal research within markets internal to the
government, as well as commercially. It is unclear if the effectiveness demonstrated by the TAP
is also found in non-acquisition agencies. This unknown represents an area for additional
exploration.
In addition, examination of the firm decision making process, including their pre-entry
characteristics, could provide more insight into who and why certain firms request support while
others do not. Lastly, a broader exploration based on commercialization assistance program
investments and programmatic outcomes could shed light into the level of funding necessary to
impact a project’s commercialization outcomes.
9. Policy Implications
9.1. Exogenous Business Support Can Enhance Success Probability
This research demonstrates that exogenous support, like the Navy’s TAP, can enhance
projects probability of commercialization success. My analysis found that the odds of
commercialization success are at least twice as likely for a project participating in the Transition
Assistance Program, compared to non-participating projects. This finding has many policy
implications, chief among them, is my belief that federal agency program managers should
strongly consider establishing commercialization assistance programs.
In establishing the SBIR/STTR programs, Congress sought to harness the innovative
capability of small businesses to both diversify the federal research and development service
marketplace and generate societal benefits. Maximizing the economic outcomes from federal
SBIR/STTR investments occurs as firms commercialize (either in commercial markets or through
the federal acquisition process) products and services which generate jobs, support advanced
weapon systems, or drive down federal research and development costs through increased
competition. While the small firms attracted to the SBIR/STTR program may be technically
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advanced, they may lack the necessary business capacity to create these down-stream societal
benefits.
Storey (2003) found that small and medium firms tend to underinvest in the services which
could augment their business capacity because they are unclear or underestimate the long-term
benefits of those investments. The Navy, through the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), has
sought to address this information failure, and to maximize the societal benefits from federal
research and development funding in a cost effective manner.
The Navy investments in the TAP has had an overall cost-benefit ratio of 37.9, indicating
an effective use of resources as measured by the increased generation of commercialization. It also
appears, that the program is an effective investment in not only maximizing the magnitude of
commercialization dollars relative to the status-quo (non-TAP outcomes), but also in creating
successes that otherwise would not occur. Given the existence of the Navy TAP, we can anticipate
27 additional successes per hundred Phase II projects.
Establishing commercialization assistance programs will not only allow federal agencies
to overcome this knowledge gap and generate increased commercialization both measured in
magnitude and probability, but also provide an alternative to penalizing unsuccessful firms, and
balance the sometimes competing goals of stimulating innovation and maximizing economic
outcomes.
9.1.2. Alternative to Penalizing Firms
Commercialization assistance programs can also be viewed as an alternative to penalties
for failure to meet commercialization performance benchmarks. As discussed previously, these
benchmarks were established to ensure firms make every effort to commercialize their
SBIR/STTR projects. While this approach implies a failure of the firm, it is possible that the failure
may be insufficient knowledge to transition from technologist to successful entrepreneurs. As a
policy tool, commercialization assistance programs can be extended to these firms prior to any
award penalties. This will ensure that their failure is firm, or technology, based, and not a reflection
of a knowledge gap.
9.1.3. Commercialization Assistance Programs Balance Dual Programmatic Goals
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The SBIR program started as an initiative to leverage the innovative capacity of small
businesses and use them in meeting federal research and development needs. Although increasing
the private sector commercialization of federal research and development innovations was among
the goals, it was not viewed as more important relative to other goals. However, with the increased
emphasis on commercialization, I fear program managers of federal research and development
programs may become more conservative in their award process, which could stymie technological
innovation.
When the program was conceptualized by Roland Tibbetts, a key feature was the ability to
test as many innovative ideas as possible. Implicit in this is an acceptance of technology failure
which is inevitable when pursuing cutting edge innovations. While project commercialization
potential is a component of the proposal evaluation process, I believe, through the implementation
of commercialization assistance programs, agencies can balance their interest in funding the most
technologically promising projects, while also pursuing economic outcomes from the federal
research investments. Commercialization assistance programs are established and organized to
augment the business capacity of participating firms, so award decisions can be tilted towards the
most innovative technology pursuits while the firm specific business risks can be mitigated through
exogenous assistance programs.
9.2. Broader Consideration of Programmatic Outcome Metrics
Prior research has often sought to draw a direct line between a given SBIR/STTR award
and commercialization outcomes. This approach fails to capture a demonstrated outcome form
social capital networks--the development of new opportunities between partnering firms
(Fountain, 1999). Social Capital (Fountain, 1999) is the process of establishing interorganizational linkages based on trust, collaboration, and networks. Innovation is enabled through
this collaborative effort. I believe the social capital enabling component of the Navy TAP
contributes to commercialization success.
In many ways the Navy TAP serves as the hub for facilitating trust amongst the various
acquisition actors. While the majority of activity is focused on the individual small firm, a key
aspect of all interactions is enhancing their capacity to partner and leverage information and
opportunities from others stakeholders. While some firms may go it alone, the majority will often
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work with a large system integrator to ultimately transition their technology to the warfighter. The
Navy TAP recognizes this pathway, and works to identify and facilitate connections with points
of contact in the major defense primes and other arms of the acquisition community. While social
capital as it relates to enabling innovation has typically focused on regional synergies and
relationships, the Navy TAP, through its Navy Opportunity Forum, attempts to overcome these
geographical boundaries by bringing together members of these communities for the opportunity
to network and develop new, or more involved, relationships.
The role the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP), and its contractor,
Dawnbreaker, play in enabling these new networks and relationships has clear policy implications.
A demonstrated outcome form social capital networks are the development of new opportunities
between partnering firms (Fountain, 1999). Unfortunately, the growth of these new connections
and possibly new lines of research and development may not be captured under current outcome
metrics applied to the SBIR/STTR programs. Prior research has focused on commercialization
outcomes related to the underlying SBIR/STTR projects. Enhancing the “social capital” of
SBIR/STTR firms can result in new partnerships that lead to the development of novel lines of
research. In lieu of this, broader outcome metrics should be used in evaluating the success of the
SBIR/STTR programs, specifically as it relates to firms involved in initiatives, like the Navy TAP,
which facilitate innovation based social capital.
9.3. Commercialization Assistance Funding Should be Increased
Current legislation allows a firm to either expend, or receive on its behalf, external
commercialization support amounting to approximately 1 percent of the typical Phase II award
amount. This figure should be reexamined to ensure the resources provided are sufficient to enable
the firm to overcome their knowledge gap, facilitate the development of social capital, and to
navigate the challenging federal acquisition communities. Congress has demonstrated a
continuous and growing emphasis on the commercialization outcomes of Federal SBIR/STTR
research investments. While their emphasis is clear, per project commercialization investments are
minor. Federal agencies and commercialization assistance providers should work to identify the
minimum level of expenditures for commercialization support and make those amounts allowable
expenditures from the SBIR and STTR set-asides.
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Instituting the expansion of commercialization assistance programs will be a challenge
because not all firms, or policy actors, believe the expenditures are warranted. Given the current
federal budgetary landscape, any expansion will most likely be funded through the SBIR and
STTR extramural set-asides. This inevitably places a challenge upon SBIR and STTR program
managers, as it will either reduce the number of Phase I or Phase II awards, or decrease the award
amounts. Either decision may be meet with reluctance both in Congress, and from SBIR/STTR
firm advocacy groups. While Congress has shown an interest in the economic outcomes, it has
also sought to diversify the geographic dispersion of SBIR and STTR awards, and may view a
reduction in awards as an affront to their outreach goals. Also, established winners of SBIR Phase
I and Phase II awards, specifically repeat winners, may not feel commercialization support is
sufficiently needed to reduce the number of awards, or decrease individual project awards.
Despite these challenges, based on the anecdotal reports, and as this research has
demonstrated, the Navy TAP is a cost-effective mechanism to both increase the magnitude of
commercialization dollars and the probability of commercialization success. I believe the Navy
TAP has demonstrated investments in commercialization assistance programs represent a cost
effective way to maximize programmatic outcomes and increase the probability of programmatic
success.
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